mosaddeq and nationalisation of oil
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_plugins/fa.rb
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# Wraps text in .lang-fa div
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module Farsi
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class FarsiTag < Liquid::Block
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def render(context)
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text = super
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site = context.registers[:site]
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converter = site.find_converter_instance(::Jekyll::Converters::Markdown)
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"<div class='lang-fa'>#{converter.convert(text)}</div>"
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end
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end
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end
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Liquid::Template.register_tag('fa', Farsi::FarsiTag)
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_posts/2022-11-13-mosaddegh-iran-national-oil.md
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---
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layout: post
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title: "Snippets from Mosaddegh's Memoirs"
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subtitle: "Readings on Iran's nationalisation of oil"
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date: 2022-11-13 00:00:00
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permalink: mosaddegh-iran-national-oil/
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categories: iran, history
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author: Mahdi
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---
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I have been reading Mosaddegh's memoirs, specifically the two books _Brief
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Account of My Life and Memoirs_ and _Summary of the Nationalisation of Oil
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Industry in Iran_, and I found reading the second book very troubling, reading
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how foreign countries such as Britain at the time played with Iran.
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Here I will be sharing snippets from Mosaddegh's Memoir which also includes
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snippets from Anthony Eden's memoirs who was the foreign minister of UK at the
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time. I will share the snippets in Persian as well as English.
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{% fa %}
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## علل سقوط دولت من
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> ایدن خاطرات خود را بدین طریق شروع میکند: «روزی که من متصدی وزارت خارجه شدم
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آبادان از دست رفته بود و نفوذ ما در خاورمیانه رو به تنزل گذاشته بود. در مصر هم
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پیش‌بینی تحولاتی میشد که لازم بود مطالعه کنم تا بدانم از چه طریق خود را
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مقابل وضعیات قرار دهم و من یقین داشتم که قبل از هر چیز باید خود را متوجه کار نفت
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نمایم که منشاء این اختلاف بود.»
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>
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> و باز میگوید: «برای ما بسیار ناگوار بود که از ترس کمونیسم بهر قیمتی که تمام شود
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با مصدّق کنار بیائیم و من هیچوقت نمیخواستم قبول کنم اگر مصدق را قبول نکنیم ایران
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کمونیست خواهد شد.» (صفحه ۲۲۱خ)
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>
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> «برای پیشرفت مقصود روز ۱۴ نوامبر ۱۹۵۱ در پاریس با آچسن وزیر خارجه امریکا وارد
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مذاکره شدم و اقامتم در آنجا ده روز طول کشید و در ظرف این مدت پنج جلسه تشکیل
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گردید که هریمن نیز در جلسات ما شرکت میکرد و روزهای اول این مذاکرات هنوز مصدق در
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امریکا بود و نظریات ما با دولت امریکا بسیار فرق داشت و موضوع مذاکرات این بود که
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مصدق را کمک بکنند و یک دولت ثابتی در ایران برقرار نمایند یا کمک نکنند و او را
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بحال خود گذارند. عقیده دولت امریکا این بود اگر باو کمک نکنند وضعیت ایران متزلزل
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خواهد شد. در صورتیکه من مخالف این نظریه بودم و میگفتم غیر از دولت مصدق و کمونیسم
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شق ثالثی هم هست و چنانچه دولت دیگری روی کار بیاید ما میتوانیم قراردادهائی با آن
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منعقد کنیم که موجب ارضای ما بشود. ایرانیان همیشه خوب بوده‌اند و باز باید
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همانطور خوب بشوند. (صفحه ۲۲۳ و ۲۲۴خ)
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>
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>«در هفتم نوامبر که ما مشغول مذاکره بودیم دو نفر از مشاورین من از لندن وارد
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پاریس شدند و موافقت نامه چرچیل و دولت انگلیس را مربوط بنظریئاتی که من قبل از
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حرکت از لندن اظهار کرده بودم بمن تسلیم کردند و این نظریات مربوط بشرکت امریکا در
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نفت ایران بود که نمایندگان آن دولت نمیخواستند از این پیش آمد استفاده کنند و از
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قبول آن خودداری میکردند و هریمن میگفت اگر این پیشنهاد در تابستان سال قبل شده بود
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در روحیه ایرانیان تاثیر بسیار مینمود. -- گرچه از این مذاکرات که تا ۱۴ نوامبر طول
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کشید نتیجه‌ای بدست نرسید و شرکت امریکا در کار نفت محرز نگردید ولی من از
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اینکه بتوانم امریکا را متقاعد کنم دولت دیگری در ایران تشکیل شود که نه مصدق باشد
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نه کمونیسم مایوس نبودم. عقیده سفیر امریکا هم در انگلیس این بود که میگفت آنجا
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منافع انگلیس در خطر است دولت امریکا باید از تحمیل نظریات خود صرفنظر کند.» (صفحه
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۲۲۶خ)
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>
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> پوشیده نماند که از همین کنفرانس هم ایدن نتایجی گرفت و دست خالی مراجعت نکرد
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بدین قرار:
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(۱) تغییر «گریدی» سفیر امریکا در ایران که شخص بی نظر و بیطرفی بود و انتصاب
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هندرسن مامور سابق امریکا در هندوستان بجای او که در انجام وظیفه بی نظر نبود یکی
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از نتایج مهم این کنفرانس بشمار می آید و ایدن در این کتاب همه جا از او قدردانی
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کرده و مخصوصاً در یکی از خاطرات اینطور اظهارنظر کرده است: «روابط انگلیس و امریکا
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بواسطه‌ی نمایندگی هندرسن در ایران روز بروز بهتر میشد و او شخص لایقی بود که
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اجازه نداد هیچوقت مصدق از اختلاف بین امریکا و انگلیس کمترین استفاده‌ای
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بکند. از او کمال تشکر داریم. چنانچه هندرسن در ایران نبود قرارداد ۱۹۵۴ اینبار نفت
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طبق نظریات ما تمام نمیشد.» (صفحه ۲۲۸خ)
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(۲) دیگر از نتایج مذاکرات این دو وزیر خارجه این بود: دولت امریکا که بعد از سقوط
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دولت من بیش از یک ملیارد کمک بدولت ایران نمود نسبت بدولت من هیچ مساعدتی ننمود و
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همان ایّام که نمایندگان دولتین در پاریس مشغول مذاکره بودند من در واشنگتن از دولت
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امریکا وامی بملاغ صد ملیون دلار درخواست نمودم که با هر سودی تغیین کنند پرداخته
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شود و از خواستن وام نظر این بود از کارگران نفت که بیکار شده بودند در امور دیگر
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تولیدی استفاده شود و آنان اجرتی در مقابل کار بگیرند. جوابی که بدرخواست من داده
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شد این بود موضوع مورد مطالعه قرار خواهد گرفت و این مطالعه آنقدر طول کشید تا دولت
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امریکا در کار نفت شرکت نمود و بعد بمن این جواب رسید: تا کار نفت با دولت انگلیس
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تمام نشود امریکا از هرگونه کمک و مساعدت معذور است. (صفحه ۲۲۸خ)
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>
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> ایدن ادامه میدهد و میگوید «مراجعت بلندن‌خواستم یک مطالعه‌ای در صحت
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عقیده خودبکنم و روی این نظر با سفیر ایران که یکی از دوستانم بود مشورت کردم.
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نظریاتم با تصدیق نمود و گفت وضعیت مصدق مثل سابق نیست و قول داد شخصا هرقدر
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میتواند با ما کمک نماید.
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>
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> هفته‌ی اول سال ۱۹۵۲ باز خبری از ایران بمن رسید که موجب تقویت روح من گردید
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و آن گزارشی بود که قونسول انگیس داده بود، یعنی همان کس که مصدق احضار او را از ما
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خواسته بود و گزارش او موافق بود با نظریات سفیر ایران در لندن که تنفر مردم ایران
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از ما روی حقیقت نیست و ساختگی است.» (صفحه۲۲۸خ)
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>
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> نویسنده خاطرات میخواهد تحت لفافه این را بگوید اگر ملت ایران بحق خود عارف بود و
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احساساتی که ابراز میکرد از روی حقیقت بود ما نمی‌توانستیم کاری بضرر آن ملت
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صورت بدهیم. در صورتیکه من هروقت صحبتی راجع بملی شدن صنعت نفت بمیان آمده
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بنمایندگان دولت ذینفع گفته‌ام در آن روز که قرارداد دارسی بامضا رسید وجود
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نفت در ایران محرز نبود و بحریه انگلیس هم احتیاجات خود را بوسیله زعال‌سنگ
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رفق میکرد ولی اکنون که متجاوز از نیم قرن است در ایران نفت استخراج میشود و از آن
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در امور سوق‌الجیشی استفاده میکنند چطور ممکن است ملت ایران راضی شود باز یک
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شرکت خارجی نفت استخراج کند و برای سوءاستفاده‌ای که میکند مملکت را از آزادی
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و استقلال محروم نماید که وزیر خارجع انگلیس در یکی از خاطرات خود آن را بدین مضمون
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آورده است: «در یکی ملاقات راجع بیادداشت ترومن -- چرچیل مصدق گفته بود ایرانیان خر
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نیستند که باز بگذارند مدتها آنان را افسار کنند.» (صفحه ۳۳۲خ)
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شماره صفحه‌ها اشاره به کتاب خاطرات ایدن دارند.
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{% endfa %}
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## Reasons for my government's downfall
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> Eden begins his memoirs in this way: "The day I became the foreign minister,
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Abadan was lost and our influence in the Middle East had declined. In Egypt,
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developments were predicted, which I needed to study in order to know how to
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confront the situation, and I was sure that, first of all, I should focus on the
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oil business, which was the origin of this dispute."
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>
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> And he says again: "It was very unfortunate for us to come to terms with
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Mossadegh at any cost out of fear of communism, and I never wanted to accept
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that if we don't accept Mossadegh, Iran will become communist." (page 221)
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>
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> "In order to advance the goal, on November 14, 1951, I entered into
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negotiations with the American Secretary of State Acheson in Paris, and my stay
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there lasted ten days, and five meetings were held during this period, in which
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Harriman also participated in our meetings, and the first days of these
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negotiations Mosaddegh was in America and our views were very different from the
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American government and the subject of the negotiations was to help Mossadegh
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and establish a stable government in Iran or not to help and leave him alone.
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The opinion of the American government was that if they do not help, Iran's
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situation will be unstable. I was against this theory and said that there is a
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third party apart from Mossadegh's government and communism, and if another
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government comes to work, we can conclude agreements with it that will satisfy
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us. Iranians have always been good and they should be good again." (pages 223 and 224)
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>
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> "On the 7th of November, when we were negotiating, two of my advisors arrived
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in Paris from London and handed me the agreement between Churchill and the
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British government regarding the opinions that I had expressed before leaving
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London, and these opinions related to the American involvement in Iranian oil
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that the representatives of that government did not want to take advantage of
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this situation and refused to accept it, and Harriman said that if this proposal
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had been made in the summer of the previous year, it would have greatly affected
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the morale of the Iranians. -- Although no results were obtained from these
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negotiations that lasted until November 14, and the American involvement in the
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oil business was not confirmed, I did not despair of being able to convince
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America to form another government in Iran that is neither Mossadegh nor
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communism. The opinion of the American ambassador in England was that he said
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that British interests are in danger there, and the American government should
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stop imposing its views." (page 226)
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>
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> It is not a secret that Eden got results from this conference and did not
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return empty-handed: (1) the change of "Grady" the US ambassador to Iran, who
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was a neutral person, and the appointment of Henderson, the former US agent in
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India, instead of him, who was on duty. His lack of impartiality is considered
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one of the important results of this conference, and Eden praised him everywhere
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in this book, and especially in one of his memoirs, he commented as follows:
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"The relations between England and America improved day by day due to
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Henderson's representation in Iran, and he was a worthy person who never allowed
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Mossadegh to take advantage of the differences between America and England. We
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are very grateful to him. If Henderson was not in Iran, the 1954 agreement on
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oil would not have turned out the way we wanted. (page 228) (2) Another result
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of the negotiations between these two foreign ministers was this: The American
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government, which after the fall of my government gave more than one billion in
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aid to Iran, did not give any aid to me, and the same days that the government
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representatives were negotiating in Paris, in Washington, I asked the American
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government for a loan of one hundred million dollars to be paid with any profit,
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and the idea of asking for a loan was to use the oil workers who were unemployed
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in other production matters and they would get paid for their work. The answer
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that was given to my request was that the issue will be studied and this study
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took so long until the American government took part in the oil business, and
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then I received this answer: until the oil business with the British government
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is finished, the United States will refrain from any help and assistance.
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(page 228)
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>
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> Eden continues and says, "I wanted to do a study on the validity of my
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opinion, and I consulted with the ambassador of Iran, who was one of my friends.
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He confirmed my views and said that Mossadegh's situation is not the same as
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before and he promised to personally help us as much as he can.
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>
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> In the first week of 1952, I received news from Iran that strengthened my
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spirit, and it was the report given by the British Consul in Iran, that is, the
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same person Mossadegh had asked us to summon, and his report agreed with the
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views of the Iranian ambassador in London, that the Iranian people's hatred of
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us is not based on the truth and is fake." (page 228)
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>
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> The author of the memoirs wants to say this under wraps, if the Iranian nation
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truly believed in their rights and the feelings it expressed were true, we could
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not have done anything to harm that nation. Whenever there is talk about the
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nationalization of the oil industry, I have said to the representatives of the
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interested government that on the day when the Darcy Agreement was reached, the
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existence of oil in Iran was not certain, and the British Navy was meeting its
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needs with coal, but now that it has been more than half a century, oil is being
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extracted from Iran and they are using it in strategic affairs. How can the
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people of Iran be satisfied with a foreign company extracting oil and depriving
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the country of its freedom and independence for the abuse it does, which the
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British Foreign Minister mentioned in one of his memoirs "In a meeting about the
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Truman-Churchill memorial, Mossadegh said that Iranians are not donkeys to let
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themselves to be ridden for a long time." (page 332)
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Page numbers refer to Eden's memoir.
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.lang-fa blockquote {
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padding-right: inherit;
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border-right: 4px solid $grey-color-light;
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padding-right: $spacing-unit / 2;
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/**
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