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419 lines
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---
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layout: post
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title: "Embodying the Avatar in Videogames"
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subtitle: "Videogames as an embodied activity"
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date: 2022-07-23 00:00:00
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permalink: embodying-the-avatar-videogames/
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categories: programming
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author: Mahdi
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---
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Videogames are a pervasive part of lives of children and adults alike, with 73%
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of Americans older than 2 years engaging with them {% cite npd2019videogames %}.
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Playing videogames can be seen as an activity that is done through our
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fingertips and with our visual apparatus focused on a screen, without
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involvement of the rest of our body, and it is usually considered as such from a
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cognitivist point of view {% cite campbell2012video %} {% cite gee2003video %}
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{% cite klimmt2006effectance %} however this raises the question of whether
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videogames can alternatively be thought of as an embodied experience, and if so,
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how can we formulate them as such, and what factors are at play?
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Virtual reality videogames are more commonly studied from an embodied
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perspective, since they lend themselves to the framework more easily by being
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more engaging to the whole body and by the fact of their immersive experience,
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however the same question can be asked for non-virtual reality games, with
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keyboard and mouse or the controller, and the screen.
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We will first talk about what do we mean by embodiment when we say playing
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videogames is an embodied experience, and this is a very important part of our
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discourse. We then continue to talk about what motivates us to think that
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videogames fit such notions of embodied experience, and from there we further
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ask questions about the factors at play, including, but not limited to, camera
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control and perspective and its relationship with peripersonal space and the
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social aspect of videogames.
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# Did Somebody Say Embodiment?
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The question of whether we can think of playing videogames as an embodied
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experience is quite puzzling, and it requires unraveling questions that are
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unanswered about what embodiment means, how do we distinguish it from else, and
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how does something like playing videogames fit into this picture. There are
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different accounts of embodiment, and they stand in contrast to cognitive
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psychogolical accounts. Cognitive psychology accounts study mental processes,
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which are usually associated with the brain, and where the body is thought of as
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an input and output interface with the world that is controlled by the brain. {%
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cite neisser2014cognitive %} {% cite anderson1980cognitive %}. There are
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numerous accounts of embodied experience, we will review some of them and lay
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out our understanding of embodiment, one which allows us to discuss videogames
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in its light.
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{% cite thelen2000grounded %} gives an account that focuses mostly on the fact
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that our experiences arise because we have a particular kind of body with
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particular capacities and apparatus that lead to us experiencing the world as we
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do. This might be one of the most high-level accounts that shares a considerable
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amount with most other embodiment accounts:
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> "\[T\]o say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from > bodily
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interactions with the world, from this point of view, cognition > depends on the
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kinds of experiences that come from having a body with > particular perceptual
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and motor capacities that are inseparably linked > and that together form the
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matrix within which memory, emotion, > language, and all other aspects of live
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are meshed.\"
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With this account, it is necessary to consider the body as a constitutive part
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of cognition, not merely an input/output system controlled by the brain.
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Questions about cognition only make sense with consideration of the way we
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interact with the world with our bodies.
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Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account unifies the body and the mind and
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instead of talking about them separately, he proposes talking about an
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intentional, lived body, that is continuously adapting to the world through
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formation of habits:
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> The body's orientation toward the world is essentially temporal, > involving a
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dialectic between the present body (characterized, after > Husserl, as an "I
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can") and the habit body, the sedimentations of past > activities that take on a
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general, anonymous, and autonomous > character. \[..\] it has affective
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experiences that are not merely > representations; and its kinesthetic sense of
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its own movements is > given directly. > > This kinesthetic awareness is made
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possible by a pre-conscious system > of bodily movements and spatial
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equivalences that Merleau-Ponty terms > the "body schema". In contrast with the
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"positional spatiality" of > things, the body has a "situational spatiality"
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that is oriented > toward actual or possible tasks. The body's existence as >
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"being-toward-the-world", as a projection toward lived goals, is > therefore
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expressed through its spatiality, which forms the background > against which
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objective space is constituted. \[..\] > > The body's relationship with space is
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therefore intentional, although > as an "I can" rather than an "I think"; bodily
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space is a > multi-layered manner of relating to things, so that the body is not
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> "in" space but lives or inhabits it. {% cite sep-merleau-ponty %}
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Merleau-Ponty's account requires substantial consideration when we talk about
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embodiment in video-games, since his terminology and framework make it easier to
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express what we are trying to affirm in this report. When we talk about
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embodiment, we are using Merleau-Ponty's framework, along with anecdotes and
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inspirations from other frameworks which we will mention.
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Let's consider one of the most important pillars of this account: our existence
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in the world is intentional, and our body, with all of its habits and its
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capabilities, shapes our intentional stance towards the world, since it is our
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body that limits our "I can\" from an endless list of possibilities down to the
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way we live right now. Cognition need not be thought of as perceiving, thinking
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(or processing), and then acting, but rather, we live in direct interaction with
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the world, and perception and thinking and acting are no longer separated, no
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longer representational, but through our long-formed habits, our spatial
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presence and a body schema that shapes our capabilities towards the world around
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us, the world appears to us directly with meanings and values.
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The body schema and our ability to morph this body schema through our
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interactions with tools and in different contexts is vital to our discourse.
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Merleau-Ponty's account allows for our body schema, which is what shapes our
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intentional stance towards the world, to be changed as we incorporate tools and
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certain environments into our lives. His famous example of a blind man's stick
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is worth mentioning:
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> "When the cane becomes a familiar instrument, the world of tactile > objects
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expands, it no longer begins at the skin of the hand, but at > the tip of the
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cane. > > \[..\] the cane is no longer an object that the blind man would >
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perceive, it has become an instrument with which he perceives. It is > an
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appendage of the body, or an extension of the bodily synthesis.\" > {% cite
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merleau1962phenomenology %}
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Andy Clark gives a similar account when talking about our embodied experience of
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using virtual reality headsets:
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> The infant, like the VR-exploring adult, must learn how to use > internally
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unresponsive hands, arms and legs to obtain its goals. > > \[..\] > > With time
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and practice, enough bodily fluency is achieved to make the > wider world itself
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directly available as a kind of unmediated arena > for embodied action. At this
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point, the extrabodily world becomes > poised to present itself to the user not
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just as a problem space > (though it is clearly that) but as a problem-solving
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resource. For the > world, specially when encountered via inhabited interaction,
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is a > place in which we can act fluently in ways that simplify or transform >
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the problems that we want to solve. At such moments, the body has > become
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"transparent equipment\": equipment that is not the focus of > attention in use.
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Instead the user "sees through\" the equipment to > the task in hand. When you
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sign your name, the pen is not normally > your focus. The pen in use is no more
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the focus of your attention than > is the hand that grips it. Both are
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transparent equipment. > {% cite clark2008supersizing %}
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To summarise what we mean by embodiment as we talk about it here:
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1. Cognition depends on our body as a whole, and our experiences that arise are
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specifically tailored by our body and its particular features.
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2. Our body has an intentional stance towards the world, and this intentional
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stance is dependent on our habits, and is limited by the capacities of our
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body.
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3. The "body schema" is what allows for our pre-conscious kinaesthetic awareness
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of our body in a "situational" sense, oriented towards possible tasks.
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# Videogaming as an Embodied Activity
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This is not a simple question, and our discussion here is not to be taken as
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granted, of course. There are many complexities involved with attributing
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something as complex as "embodiment" to an activity as complex as playing
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videogames. This is a puzzling notion, but nevertheless, it is worth considering
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and thought.
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Given the framework described, we can now formulate videogaming as an embodied
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activity. A more trivial example of what we are trying to formulate is driving
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cars, which is a common example used when talking about embodiment in cognitive
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science. When we drive a car as a proficient driver, we manoeuvre by considering
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what we want to do, and acting towards that direct goal without focusing on how
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we do this by using the gears, the clutch, the brake, pedal and the wheel, etc.
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We might be taking 3 to 4 actions at the same time, e.g. when reverse turning:
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brake in, clutch in, wheel to one side, change gears to reverse, look in the
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mirrors, however we are mostly thinking about where we want to go, not all the
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details and specifics of our interactions with the car's interface. Similar to
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the example of the blind man and the stick, the apparatus has become transparent
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and now our body schema includes the car. We decide we want to reverse and turn
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to one side, and given our new intentional stance towards the world that is
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limited and extended using the car, we consider our self to be capable of doing
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so. The way we question and talk about the world changes, too, we ask "do I fit
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here?", wondering if we can pass through a narrow passage with the car, we are
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now embodying a new intentional stance towards the world, and this new body
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schema is what gets attribution for our action.
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Videogames are similar, with the difference that instead of sitting inside a car
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that moves spatially in the world, our human body sits in one place, but we
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still go places in the game-world. A proficient gamer is not concerned with the
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buttons they press or how they move the mouse, for example, they are directly
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concerned with what they do in the game-world. A new intentional stance arises
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towards the game-world, that is defined by the avatar that we embody in the
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videogame.
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Our body schema is now extended to include the avatar in the game-world, and
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this new body-schema limits what our human body does (just like in driving a car
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where some of our body is not actively used towards our goals), *we* now want to
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*climb* things with our new intentional body, and *shoot* the monsters and we
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feel real feelings of anxiety and stress (and we may even sweat) when we are
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playing a stealth game and we are in hiding. *We* are afraid of being found out,
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and when we are getting hit by enemies or falling from a height, our human body
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tenses, and we sometimes even get the feeling of falling dropping in our stomach
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(this can depend a lot on the camera of the video-game, which we will talk
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about). When playing a car or motorcycle racing game, our human body inevitably
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leans in as we are turning in the game-world. video-games have structured
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worlds, with certain rules that make them predictable enough to an experienced
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player, much like the real world, this can lead to us believing that we have
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control over the world and we can take guided actions towards certain ends. A
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high correspondence between our interactions with the interface that connects us
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to our extended body in the game-world (e.g. the game controller, or the
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keyboard and the mouse) and visual and proprioceptive feedback might be the key
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to creating a strong sense of ownership of actions. {% cite martin1995bodily %}
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{% cite tsakiris2005experimenting %}
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Besides the notion of embodiment that we have been discussing so far, there are
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other kinds of embodiment. Social embodiment seems to be a slightly more
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ambiguous and challenging notion that must be considered with care, but consider
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{% cite barsalou2003social %}'s account of social embodiment effects:
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> "First, perceived social stimuli do not just produce cognitive states, > they
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produce bodily states as well. Second, perceiving bodily states > in others
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produces bodily mimicry in the self. Third, bodily states in > the self produce
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affective states. Fourth, the compatibility of bodily > states and cognitive
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states modulates performance effectiveness\"
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Real-time online video-games can exhibit similar effects, I may walk with my
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avatar towards a friend's avatar in the gameworld and wave my hand, leading to
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them waving their hand, and as I start walking away, they might follow me and we
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may start an activity together without need for verbal or text communication,
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but rather only by the effect of our avatar's state of body. We have learned the
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affordances of our new environment and our new extended body, and that of our
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fellow players.
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# Camera, Avatar and Controller Relations
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The camera-avatar relationship and the input interface are important factors to
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be considered when asking questions about embodiment of the experience, so it is
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necessary to consider these factors more explicitly.
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<figure id="fig:first-person" class="row">
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<img alt="First-person view" src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/first-person.jpg"
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width="30%"/>
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<img alt="Third-person view" src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/third-person.jpg"
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width="30%"/>
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<img alt="Isometric view" src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/diablo-view.jpg"
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width="30%"/>
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<div class="break"></div>
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<figcaption>Different video-game camera modes. From left to right:
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First-person view, Third-person view and Isometric view.</figcaption>
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</figure>
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<figure id="fig:dota" class="row">
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<img alt="Camera's independence from the avatar in Dota2"
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src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/dota-1.png" width="30%" />
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<img alt="Camera's independence from the avatar in Dota2"
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src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/dota-2.png" width="30%" />
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<img alt="Camera's independence from the avatar in Dota2"
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src="/img/embodying-the-avatar/dota-3.png" width="30%" />
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<div class="break"></div>
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<figcaption>Camera's independence from the avatar in Dota 2.</figcaption>
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</figure>
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Most research around this subject seems to focus on a First-Person view, where
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the player is looking out through the avatar's eyes or head, only able to see
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the avatar's arms most of the time. This is the view adopted almost exclusively
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by all Virtual Reality games and many shooter games. The controller used with
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this type of view is either a dual-axis controller or mouse and keyboard where
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the character is moved with keys on the keyboard and the camera (or rather, the
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head of the avatar!) is moved using the mouse. This camera-avatar relation and
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interface seems to fit the research literature most of the time since it is
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considered directly by researchers most of the time. (Figure
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[1](#fig:first-person)).
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Another common view in video-games is the third-person view where the camera
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moves along with the avatar as the avatar moves. The camera usually has the
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ability to look around the avatar by rotating in its place, but never able to
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move away from the avatar across any axis. This view is also similarly
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accompanied by either dual-axis controller or keyboard and mouse where the
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keyboard is used to move the avatar and the camera while the mouse is used to
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rotate the camera. (Figure [2](#fig:third-person))
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Note that these two camera modes, albeit similar in some aspects, lend us
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completely different body schemas and they change our intentional stance
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strongly. This is best illustrated by the online multi-player video-game Dead by
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Daylight, where in a post-apocalyptic setting, a group of survivors are trying
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to survive against a killer who is trying to kill them, both of which are played
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by actual players. What is interesting is that the survivors and the killer use
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different camera views, and this is an important distinction between the two.
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Survivors have third-person camera which allows them to rotate the camera and
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look behind them as they are running away or as they are trying to fix a broken
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engine to get their car running so they can run away, this also means that the
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survivors avatars do not move their head as the camera is moved. On the
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contrary, the killer has first-person camera, this means that the killer can
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only look in the direction that they are running in, and this allows survivors
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to be able to know where the killer is currently looking at by looking at them.
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There is a significant difference between how these two roles are played in this
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video-game mostly because of the camera movement, each player has a different
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body schema depending on which camera mode they have.
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A less common, but still discussed in the literature type of camera-avatar
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relation is that of isometric cameras locked on the character, found in the
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Diablo game series. This kind of camera-avatar relation is very similar to a
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third-person view, with the difference that the camera is taking an isometric
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angle and is not controlled by the user at all, merely following the avatar. The
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controls used for this kind of game are usually either a dual-axis controller,
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or in case of keyboard and mouse, the mouse, rather than the keyboard, is used
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to move the avatar by issuing commands to move to a certain place. This type of
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movement control might seem unintuitive, however {% cite klevjer2012enter %}
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proposes that "because the clicking happens so fast, the experience nevertheless
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approaches a sense of "pulling\" the avatar through a tangible interface.\" and
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as such, the control interface can still create a sense of high correspondence
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between the player's actions and movements of the avatar, reaching a real-time
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synchrony as mastery of the control interface is reached.
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What is common between these three camera-avatar relations is the tight coupling
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of the camera with the avatar: the camera always follows the avatar as the
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avatar moves around the world. In some cases, the camera can be rotated or moved
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around slightly to peek around a box while crouching for example, but almost
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always the camera and the avatar are in tight synchrony. {% cite
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klevjer2012enter %} considers all of these camera modes to fall under the same
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umbrella of camera indirectly controlled by the movements of the avatar, as if
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the camera is pulled by the avatar around with an invisible string.
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This group of camera-avatar relations can be considered to be intuitive and
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similar to how we as humans almost always have a synchrony between our vision
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and our body, with exception of cases like out-of-body experiences where a
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person sees the world and their own body from a place outside of their physical
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body. {% cite blanke2004out %} However, there are video-games where something
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analogous to an out-of-body experience happens, and these are video-games where
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the camera is not automatically attached to the avatar, but rather, the player
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has manual control of the camera. This camera-avatar relation is most
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characteristic of MOBA (Multiplayer online battle arena) games such as Dota 2,
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where the camera angle in relation to the avatar is very similar to that of
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Diablo, with the difference that the mouse is not only used to move the avatar,
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but also allows panning of the camera across the world. (Figure [6](#fig:dota))
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In these videogames you are allowed to look at the world and your avatar from
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any place, and given our framework, the camera is now a novel extension to our
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body-schema. Most embodied activities exhibit the same synchrony of vision and
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body, like walking, swimming, driving a car, and in most cases of playing
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videogames too, however in this case, we have a new range of intentional acts
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available to us, through movement of the camera around the world. Our
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body-schema now includes a different apparatus to work with, it's as if our
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vision is no longer limited to our body, but rather there is a drone above us
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that we can see from.
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This opens up the possibility of a new kind of vision interaction with the
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world. When the stakes are high, as is the case with e-sports, players strive
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for the ultimate proficiency with their new body-schema, and the result is ways
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of using vision that are not usual and can sometimes be cryptic for us. Camera
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movement of professional players tends to be very fast, and sometimes outright
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chaotic to an untrained eye since they want to optimise being able to scout for
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information while still keeping an eye on their avatar, since the avatar is
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still the most important part of the game, and the free-form camera movement is
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mostly used similar to a binocular: to scout for information.
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# Further Questions
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There is a question to be asked here about how much this technical camera-avatar
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independence leads to actual camera-avatar independence: do players actually end
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up with their camera away from their avatar much, or is the camera still in
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synchrony with the avatar for the majority of the time, but in a manner directly
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controlled by the player rather than automatically.
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Does the camera-avatar independence affect the embodied experience of playing
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this videogame, perhaps by making it more difficult to be proficient in the
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game, it is initially harder to extend your body-schema with this new form of
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vision, but what happens once you are proficient?
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Competitive e-sports increase the stakes and are motivation for players to
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strive for utmost proficiency in a videogame, this usually leads to players
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being very creative and highly skilled in using the interface available to them
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(e.g. mouse and keyboard or a controller). In case of MOBA games with
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independent cameras, players reach very high action-per-minute numbers, in the
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last game of the largest competition for Dota 2, The International 10, the
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players averaged 303 actions per minute, which is about 5 actions per second,
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not including camera movements (camera movements are fluid and continuous and
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are not considered as discrete, hence their exclusion from a numerical value).
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{% cite dotabuff-true-sight %}
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{% cite dolezal2009remote %} considers the question of action-ownership and
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stakes with regards to telesurgery and embodiment. She stresses the importance
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of a feeling of agency towards the task at hand, and proposes that high-fidelity
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technologies could help induce a sense of agency and ownership of action.
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There is a place to ask a similar question about videogames, when the stakes are
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high, such as competitions with millions of dollars at stake, do players think
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of the actions they take in the game as their own, do they feel complete agency
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towards their actions in the game? What factors are at play here?
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There is a place to ask a similar question about video-games, when the stakes
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are high, such as competitions with millions of dollars at stake, do players
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think of the actions they take in the game as their own, do they feel complete
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agency towards their actions in the game?
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# Conclusion
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Videogames are usually formulated under information-processing cognitive models
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when studied in cognitive science, however on a closer look, they can be
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considered an embodied activity given the right framework. Here we consider
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Merleau-Ponty's intentional stance and body schema as a framework to formulate
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how a videogame might be considered an embodied activity.
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Camera-avatar relations are an important factor affecting our intentional stance
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in a videogame, and they lend us different body schemas, from first-person and
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third-person camera views to an independent isometric camera that is controlled
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by the player. Independent cameras in videogames allow for a novel extension to
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our body-schema, an apparatus for vision that can move independent of the body.
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There are still many questions left to be explored on the topic, and rightly so,
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as the notion of videogames as an embodied activity is fairly perplexing and
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requires a lot more exploration and study until we reach a more holistic
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understanding of it.
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{% bibliography --cited %}
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